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DOES THE "ONE-PARTY CONSENT" EXCEPTION
EFFECTUATE THE UNDERLYING GOALS OF TITLE III?
INTRODUCTION
Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968'
(hereinafter Title III) was enacted to give law enforcement agencies statutory
authority under specifically described standards2 to conduct wiretapping or
electronic surveillance.3 Because law enforcement agencies4 have frequently
utilized Title Il, the majority of cases have dealt with the suppression of
evidence obtained through electronic surveillance.' In addition, Congress saw
the need to place safeguards on the use of electronic surveillance for the pro-
tection of the private individual. These safeguards were necessary due to the
tremendous advances in technology, making the possibility of widespread use
and abuse of electronic surveillance6 a threat to every household and office.7
Because of the need to protect individual privacy, the legalization of elec-
tronic surveillance, through enactment of Title I1, was strongly opposed. By
legally sanctioning the use of eavesdropping8 on the pretext of combating
organized crime,' those opposing the enactment saw Title III as the arrival of
"Big Brother."'" In an effort to gain support of Title Ill, the legislation became
'Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211-23 119681 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1979 & Supp.
1984)).
'See generall.v. 18 U.S.C. § 2518. A wiretap may be obtained from a judge or magistrate upon written re-
quest by a law enforcement officer. The request must include a complete statement of the facts essential to
determine the need for the authorization, the identity of the requesting officer, the time period of the re-
quest, and existence of previous application or request for extensions. The request must show probable cause
concerning commission of a crime, that normal investigative procedures will not succeed in the apprehen-
sion of the criminals and there is probable cause the crime is being committed at the location. The request
must identify the person whose communications are to be intercepted, the type of surveillance employed, the
identity of the agency authorized to use surveillance and the period of time the surveillance is to be autho-
rized.
'The term electronic surveillance will be used to include wiretapping, acquisition of oral communication and
the recording of any conversation by any means.
IS. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess, reprinted in !968 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2154
1hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 10971.
1114 CONG. REC. 14,160 (1968).
'A conservative estimate would be that more than 12,000 wiretaps and bugs are installed annually by local
law enforcement agencies. A. WESTIN. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 127 (1967).
'Comment, Wiretapping: The Federal Law, 51 J. CRiM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 441, 448 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Wiretapping: The Federal Law].
8
"Eavesdropping was an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a nuisance." Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); "Perhaps as good a definition of eavesdrop-
ping as another is that it is listening secretly and sometimes snoopily to conversations and discussions be-
lieved to be private by those engaged in them." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 71 (1967) (Black, J., dis-
senting).
IS. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2223.
'
0G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
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a compromise between Title Ill's use as a tool for combating crime" and its
potential intrusion upon the private individual. Therefore, the drafters of Title
Ill were faced with the task of formulating legislation to protect private
citizens from the existing technology available for electronic surveillance
"while arming the prosecution with a powerful weapon"'2 to combat crime.
These developments resulted from the Supreme Court's holding in Berger v.
New York,' 3 that protection of the individual and his privacy should not be
relegated to a "second class" position.'
In an attempt to control the "dirty business" of electronic surveillance"5
and desire not to totally legalize "peeping toms,' ' 6 Title III restricted private
electronic surveillance to those situations where a participant consented to or
authorized the interception 7 of the communications. 8
Title III is an attempt to balance two purposes - protection of private
citizens and control of organized crime. 9 Because of these diametric purposes,
discussion of all aspects of Title III is beyond the scope of this comment. The
first section of this comment will discuss the Supreme Court's past and present
position on the use of electronic surveillance. The remainder of the comment
will trace the development of the "one-party consent" exception as codified in
Title III, analyzing its continued validity and applicability to private
unauthorized electronic surveillance.
JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
The problem of controlling wiretapping was not new to Congress. The
first wiretapping regulation was passed in 1917.20 This legislation allowed elec-
tronic surveillance by governmental agencies, placing no restrictions on the
use of electronic surveillance during private conversations. In Olmstead v.
United States2', the Supreme Court considered the propriety of law enforce-
ment officials wiretapping the defendant's telephone. The evidence obtained
"Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title II1: Rewriting the Laws oJ Electronic Surveillance. 74 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY I, 3 11983) thereinafter cited as Goldsmithl.
2Goldstone, The Federal Wiretapping Law. 44 TEX. B. J. 382, 387 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Goldstonel.
33388 U.S. 41 (1967).
"Berger, 388 U.S. at 49 (quoting Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng.
Rep. 807 11765) f95 Eng. Rep. 807 is not an accurate reproduction)).
'Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 $1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
'S. REP. No. 1097. supra note 4, at 2224.
'Interception is defined as -the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communications
through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510)4).
"By limiting private surveillance to those instances where the consenting party does not use the conversa-
tion to injure the non-consenting party, Congress felt "lthey hadi gone about as far in that respect as Ithey
couldl under the Constitution." 114 CON(;. REc. 14,728 $19681.
"J. CARR. THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 201 (19771 thereinafter cited as Carr.
-"Act of Oct. 29. 1918. ch. 197. 40 Stat. 1017.
2277 U.S. 438 11928).
[Vol. 18:3
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by this wiretap was admitted at trial, resulting in a conviction for conspiracy to
sell liquor. Because there was no physical trespass upon the home of the defen-
dant, the Supreme Court refused to hold that this was an illegal search22 in
violation of the fourth amendment.23 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majori-
ty, explicitly stated that the proper method to stop this practice was through
Congressional legislation. 4 The Olmstead decision was not without criticism.
Justice Holmes stated this decision was a legalization of the "dirty business" of
eavesdropping. 5 By condemning electronic surveillance in his dissent, Justice
Brandeis foresaw the adverse impact this decision would have on society.26
The Communications Act of 193421 [hereinafter §6051 was-the first major
piece of legislation used in an attempt to alleviate the fears of Justice Brandeis.
Although the original purpose of the statute was to define the jurisdiction of
the Federal Communications Commission 9 , the courts began to use this
statute to control electronic surveillance.29 However, the statute was not suffi-
cient to meet the growing technological developments?0
In 1957"', another inadequacy of §605 became apparent when the
Supreme Court, in Rathburn v. United States,32 allowed the admission of
evidence recorded with the consent of a party to the conversation. In Rath-
burn, police listened on an extension phone while the defendant threatened to
commit a murder. Although the elements necessary for suppression33 of this
evidence existed, the Court held "that the clear inference [of §6051 is that one
entitled to receive the communication may use it for his own benefit or have
another use it for him."34 Rathburn became the basis of the "one party
consent" exception codified in Title III.11
"Carr, supra note 19, at § 1.03.
21Olmstead. 277 U.S. at 466.
"'ld. at 465.
'Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissentingi.
'id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2The Communications Act of 1934, ch. 625. § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 119621.
"No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person.
'!Goldsmith, supra note 1I. at II.
-'See. Carr, supra note 19, at § 1.02121.
'Although 42 U.S.C.§ 605 did not provide for civil liability if the communication was intercepted and
divulged, the availability of civil damages was recognized. See, Carr. supra note 19. at § 1.02121(di: contra.
Daly v. CBS, 309 F.2d 83, 85 (7th Cir. 19621.
"in 1940, President Roosevelt authorized wiretapping on the pretext of national security. The majority of
courts held that this evidence was not suppressible under 47 U.S.C. § 605.
32355 U.S. 107 (1957).
"142 U.S.C. § 605 required that the communication be intercepted and divulged to constitute a violation.
Comment, Wiretapping: The Federal Law. supra note 7, at 442.
Rathburn. 355 U.S. at 110.
"See generally. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(21(c) & (dl.
Winter, 19851 COMMENTS
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Although the "one-party consent" exception was codified in Title Ill, the
rationale of Olmstead 6 did not begin to erode"1 until Irvine v. United States.
In Irvine, the Court did not overrule Olmstead, but they did begin to imply
that electronic surveillance may constitute a violation of the fourth amend-
ment." However, six years later, in Silverman v. United States,40 the Court ap-
plied the rationale of Olmstead by finding that inserting a spike mike into
defendant's wall, placing it in contact with the heating system, was an illegal
search and seizure under the fourth amendment. Although the Court refused
to base their decision of whether there had been a technical trespass upon a
home under local property law, the holding rested on "the right of every man
to retreat to his home.""
Not until 1967, in Katz v. United States," did the Supreme Court overrule
Olmstead and its progeny by stating "Itihe Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places." 3 This decision paved the way for Title III and the protection
of privacy."
Six months" - before Katz, the Supreme Court decided Berger v. New
York.' In Berger, the Supreme Court held that a New York wiretap statute47
was unconstitutional. The Berger decision provided Congress with the
necessary framework to draft federal legislation by setting out the major
criteria for a constitutionally permissible statute regulating electronic
surveillance. The Court established eight criteria to obtain authorization for
electronic surveillance. The law enforcement officials requesting authority for
electronic surveillance must show:
I. Particularity in describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized.
36277 U.S. 438 (1928).
"Goldsmith, supra note II, at 13.
3347 U.S. 128 (1954).
"U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Q'365 U.S. 505 (1961).
'Goldsmith, supra note II, at 14.
42389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'ld. at 351.
"Carr, supra note 19, at § 1.02111: Note, Interspousal Wiretaps. 34 S.C.L. REV. 158, 163 (1982) (the right to
privacy is to protect people not places).
The Supreme Court decided Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 11967 on June 12, 1967. Katz, 389 U.S. 347
11967), was decided on Dec. 18. 1967.
1"388 U.S. 41 119671.
"N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRtX. 813-a, repealedby. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRIO. § 700.05-.70 JMcKinney 1971).
"in the S. RE'. No. 1097, Senator Scott explained the unsuccessful attempts Congress had made to pass ap-
propriate legislation concerning electronic surveillance. After World War II, an attempt was made to pass a
bill. But it was not until the Kennedy administration that a bill was introduced to help law enforcement of-
ficials to combat organized crime. In 1961, Kennedy sent proposals to Congress. These proposals were
followed by 1962 and 1963 proposals in an attempt to authorize electronic surveillance for national security,
against organized crime and other serious crimes. Congress took no action on any of these proposals. S. REP.
No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2267 (Individual Views of Mr. Scott).
[Vol. 18:3
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2. Particularity in describing the crime that has been, is being, or is about
to be committed.
3. Particularity in describing the type of conversation sought.
4. Limitations on the officer executing the eavesdrop over which would
a) prevent his searching unauthorized areas.
b) prevent further searching once the property sought is found.
5. Probable cause in seeking to renew the eavesdrop order.
6. Dispatch in executing the eavesdrop order.
7. Requirement that executing officer makes return of eavesdrop order
showing what was seized.
8. A showing of exigent circumstances in order to overcome the defect of
not giving prior notice.9
In Berger, the Court considered open-ended eavesdropping orders uncon-
stitutional.' Because of the extremely controversial nature of electronic sur-
veillance,5' and the need to comply with the requirements of Berger, Congress
seemed to be faced with an insurmountable task. One of the greatest problems
with the Berger criteria was giving notice to the party who was the subject of
the electronic surveillance.52 Because of these requirements, the enactment of
legislation complying with the constitutional standard required by the fourth
amendment53 and the Berger criteria seemed very difficult.5" While Congress
was attempting to overcome this notice requirement, the Supreme Court decid-
ed Katz. In Katz, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated "[tihe very
nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant to the suspect's con-
sent."55 This decision not only clarified the criteria of Berger but simplified the
requirement of notice to the suspect. This enabled Congress to devise a notice
requirement, giving the suspect notice of the wiretap after the information had
been obtained,56 as well as giving the authorizing magistrate a copy of the
'S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2161-62.
"'Carr, supra note 19, at § 1.01121.
""Congress drafted this statute with exacting precision as its principal sponsor Senator John L. McClellan
stated 'a bill as controversial as this requires close attention to the dotting of every i' and the crossing of
every 't"." Silver, IRS Use of Wiretap Evidence in Civil Tax Proceedings in Doubt Despite Recent Case. 56
J. TAXN 300, 300 (1982).
"Berger. 388 U.S. at 60.
"Kinoy v. Mitchell, 331 F. Supp. 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). ("Congress intended ITitle III to be as per-
suasive as the Fourth Amendment's constitutional standards as set forth in Berger. ")
'in his dissent in Berger, Justice Black explained "Since secrecy is an essential, indeed a definitional element
of eavesdropping, when the Court says there shall be no eavesdropping without notice lof eavesdropping to
the party], the Court means to inform the Nation there shall be no eavesdropping - period." Berger, 388
U.S. at 86 (Black, J., dissenting).
"Katz, 389 U.S. at 358.
"Congress prescribes a ninety day time limit on notification to the person who was subject to the electronic
surveillance. This time limit may be postponed upon a showing of good cause. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
COMMENTSWinter, 19851
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material obtained by electronic surveillance.57
Because of these stringent requirements and the apprehension surround-
ing legalization of electronic surveillance, the passage of Title IIl was difficult.
Many supported President Johnson's proposals allowing electronic
surveillance only in cases of national security." Because some favored elec-
tronic surveillance in the interest of the nation," Title IIl was passed with the
dual purpose of "protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications land]
delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which
the interceptions of wire and oral communications may be authorized."'
As well as meeting the constitutional standard of Berger, the statute
eliminated some of the problems of §605. By enacting Title 111, Congress made
it clear that §605 was no longer an effective tool to negate the abuse of elec-
tronic surveillance.' To constitute a violation of Title 111, both interception
and divulgence were no longer necessary. 2
Title II1 can be analyzed in three tiers. 3 The first tier deals with criminal
offenses. ' This section describes the various exceptions, to the requirements
of Title 111.1 The second tier deals with both criminal and civil offenses pro-
viding strong deterrence for violations of the statute by excluding evidence im-
properly obtained. 7 Because of Berger and the Court's desire to protect
unauthorized invasion of privacy, the third tier provides a civil cause of action
for violation of Title 111.68 Although Title IIl is restrictive in nature, it still per-
mits some types of invasion on conversational privacy' as long as the elec-
5S. REP. No. 1097 supra note 4, at 2162.
5ld at 2223 (Individual Views of Mr. Long of Missouri and Mr. Hart in Opposition to Title Ill).
sWestin, The Wiretapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 186
11952) Ihereinafter cited as Westin).
"S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2153.
"Carr. supra note 19. at § 8.01141147 U.S.C. § 605 was amended upon passage of Title III to only cover
radio communications).
':See. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (an interception or divulgence is a violation lemphasis added)).
"
3Note, Interspousal Wiretaps, 34 S.C.L. REV. 158, 160 11982).
-See, 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
"For an explanation of exception to warrant requirements see. C. FISHMAN. WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROP.
PIN( § 8 (1978).
'An example of one exception is 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). Some early cases interpreted this section not to require
a warrant for electronic surveillance in cases of national security, see. e.g., Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitch-
ell, 58 F.R.D. 139 IE.D. Pa. 1972). In United States v. United States Dist. Ct.. 407 U.S. 297, 301 (19721, the
Supreme Court held that § 2511(3) is merely a disclaimer of congressional intent to define presidential
powers in matters affecting national security and is not a grant of authority to conduct warrantless national
security surveillances. In 1978, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-51 I, 92
Stat. 1783 1codified at 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1811 ISupp. IV 1984) was enacted. The Carter administration only
obtained 322 orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, as compared to the Reagan Ad-
ministration's obtaining 433, a substantial increase possibly echoing a -serious threat to civil liberties."
Richard, Unleashing the Intelligence Community, 69 A.B.A.J. 906, 906 11983).
'
7See generally. 18 U.S.C. § 2515.
-See generally, 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
"Carr, supra note 19, at § 1.01121(b).
[Vol. 18:3
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tronic surveillance is not used to commit "a criminal, tortious or... other in-
jurious act" to a party to the conversation.' However, for civil liability under
the third tier of Title III, the person whose conversation is intercepted must
have an "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and... that the expectation
is reasonable.''
Congress was cognizant of the need to protect the private citizen from
electronic surveillance, while permitting law enforcement agents to combat
organized crime. Therefore, the purpose of the legislation "was to effectively
prohibit all interceptions of oral communications, except those specifically pro-
vided for in ITitle 1111."7
Although Title III was enacted to regulate electronic surveillance, its ma-
jor purpose was to combat organized crime.7" To carry otut this purpose, the
drafters armed law enforcement officials with adequate opportunity to use
electronic surveillance against the criminal underworld. Because of the inter-
nal checks that organized crime has upon its membership and the difficult task
of infiltration in the ordinary investigative manner, the drafters recognized the
utility ' of electronic surveillance to offset these obstacles. Congress provided
law enforcement agencies with the statutory authority to obtain warrants
(with some exceptions) 5 for using electronic surveillance as an investigative
tool.7
The need for electronic surveillance to combat crime was met with strong
opposition." Senator Long, an avid critic of Title 111,71 stated, "to help elimi-
nate crime, Congress is asked to sell its soul for a mess of porridge.' 9 It was felt
that electronic surveillance would at some point become a governmental intru-
' 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d); see also. Goldstone supra note 12, at 384.
"18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). The expectation of privacy requirement is derived from Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
"United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974).
'IS. REP.No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2157; see also, Comment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity,
7 U. TOL. L. REV. 185, 198 (1975).
"Berger. 388 U.S. at 62.
"5The Senate Report defined three exceptions to the warrant requirements of the act stating no warrant is
necessary for presidential orders of electronic surveillance in the protection of national security, for
employees of the Federal Communications Commission in normal course of their employment, and
employees of a communications common carrier in normal course of their employment. S. REP. No. 1097,
supra note 4, at 2153-54.
'Because of Congress' desire to eliminate unauthorized electronic surveillance, they made the manufactur-
ing or possession of devices used for electronic surveillance a violation of the act. See. 18 U.S.C.§ 2512:
United States v. Reed, 489 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1974) (conviction for possession of electronic surveillance in-
struments or equipment): see generally, Carr, supra note 19. at § 8.01.
"S. REP. No. 1097, .supra note 4, at 2222 (Individual Views of Mr. Long of Missouri and Mr. Hart in Opposi-
tion to Title i111).
"Mr. Long expressed his concern as to the effectiveness by stating, "Big Brother is well on his way
technologically. Do we want to spread his arrival legally by sanctioning the use of his tools especially when
their application will have little or no effect in lessening crime." Id. at 2223.
791d.
Winter, 19851 COMMENTS
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sion" greater than the crimes Title 111 was authorized to control." However,
Title IIl was enacted imposing minimal standards on state2 and federal elec-
tronic surveillance. States" may enact their own electronic surveillance
statutes, but they must conform to the minimal constitutional standards."4
Although Title III was enacted as a vehicle to control crime, the drafters
attempted to broadly prohibit unauthorized electronic surveillance. This pro-
hibition was designed to balance the need for electronic surveillance and the
deterrence of private electronic surveillance. To effectuate this prohibition,
criminal" and civil" causes of action were provided. Although the legislation
of Title III dealt for the most part with the controls and regulations necessary
for compliance with the constitutional standards,87 an equally important aspect
of Title III was "the protection of the law-abiding citizen." 8 Some legislators
opposed Title III because of their fears that no adequate safeguards could be
provided to protect private citizens.
But Title III was proposed and enacted with the protection of private citi-
'"Coliver, Electronic Surveillance: How Much Is Too Much?. 18 Trial 61, 64 (Sept. 19821.
'"The Attorney General-elect has now made it plain that he intends to protect us from crime, even if he has
to creep electronically into our homes." Tap. Tap. Tap. Washington D.C. Post, Jan. 17, 1969 at 18, col. 2.
"As a general rule, federal courts can admit evidence that violates a state statute more restrictive than the
federal statute. United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (in absence of direct con-
flict, Title Ill is not controlled by stricter state statute), cert denied. 429 U.S. 1075 (1977): United States v.
Kaiser. 660 F.2d 724, 734 19th Cir. 1981) (Although consent of all parties to conversation was necessary
under state statute, admissibility of evidence in federal court was admissible without the consent of one par-
ty).
13State statutes concerning electronic surveillance are: ALA. CODE §§ 13A- 11-30. to 37. (1975); ALASKA
SrAr. §§ 42.20.3.00-.340 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3004 to 3014 (1978); ARK. STAT. § 73-1810
11979): CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-637.2 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-15-101 to -104
!1973); CONN. GEN. SrAT. ANN §§ 53a-187 to 189 (West 1982); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 1I, § 1336 (1979); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 to -556 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01 -. 10 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983); GA CODE
ANN. §§ 16-11-60 to 69(1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 803-41 to-50 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6701 to
-6709 (Supp. 1984); ILL_ ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-1 (Smith-Hurd 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (1979); KAN.
SrAT. ANN. §§ 22-2514 to -2519 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 526.010-.080 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
15:1301 to :1312 (West 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 709-712 (West 1980); MD. Cis. JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -412 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.539 - .540d (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.A.01-.23 (West 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-25-53
(1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-701 to-712)1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
179.410 -. 515 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A.I to -A:l 1(1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-I to
-26 (West 1971); N.M. SrAr. ANN. §§ 30-12-1 to -11 (Supp. 1983); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05 - .70
(McKinney 197 1); N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 14-158 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 8-10-07.2 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 4931.28 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAr. tit. 13, §§ 176.1-.14 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721 to .739
(1981); PA. STAr. tit. 18 §§ 5701-5726 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-5.1-1 to 16 (1981); S.D.
CODIFIEDt LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-35A-I to -21 (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-1324 (1982); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 18.20 (Vernon Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 19.2-61 to -70 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE §§
9.73.030 to 100 (1973); WisC. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27-.33 (West 1985); WvO. STAT. § 37-259.1 (1977).
94114 CONG. REC. 14,728 (1968).
-518 U.S.C. § 2511.
-18 U.S.C. § 2520.
"See supra text accompanying notes 46-57.
"115 CONG. REC. 23,238 (1969).
9Westin, supra note 59, at 188.
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zens as one of its major concerns. 0 This topic was debated at length on the
Senate floor. Senator Long of Missouri, who opposed Title IlI, expressed his
fear that Title Ill "would take away all rights of our own citizens to privacy."9
Senator McClellan, the strongest supporter of Title II, responded, "Imly bill
prohibits any invasion of privacy except in certain cases where the court orders
it." 2 Senator McClellan's interpretation of the purpose of Title III was sup-
ported by Senator Fong. Senator Fong strongly endorsed Title Ill's provision
protecting "the individual from electronic invasion of his privacy by private
persons.""3 This debate clearly indicates that Title Ill was enacted as a broad
prohibition of private electronic surveillance, allowing only authorized surveil-
lance.94 This interpretation was supported by the Supreme Court, who recog-
nized Title IlIl's importance for the protection of private citizens "against the
abuse of electronic surveillance made possible by the secrecy without detec-
tion"", and the technological advances in the field of electronic surveillance."
Although Title Ill's main purpose was to control organized crime, it also
protected private individuals from an unauthorized invasion of their privacy"
by other private citizens as well as law enforcement agents. Title III has
restricted many possible forms of electronic surveillance but the possibility of
intrusion into the innermost feelings of many individuals ' is not totally pro-
hibited.' 0' Title IlI allows electronic surveillance without court authorization 0
when one of the parties to the conversation consents to the electronic
surveillance, unless the purpose of the interception is to commit a criminal, tor-
tious or other injurious act.'0 '
THE ONE-PARTY CONSENT EXcEPTION
A major exception to Title IlIl's requirement for a warrant is the "one-
party consent" exception. This exception developed from undercover agents'
IuBerger, 388 U.S. at 65 (Douglas, J., concurring).
11114 CONG REC. 12,284 (1968).
921d.
91d. at 12,296.
"S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2274 (Individual Views Messers. Dirkens, Hruska, Scott, Thurmond onTitles 1, 11, & 111).
"Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 119721.
'Galloway, The Uninited Ear: The Fourth Amendment Ban on Electronic General Searches. 22 SAN IA
CLARA L. REV. 993, 1010 (19821 [hereinafter cited as Gallowayl.
"Jandak v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815. 819 IN.D. Ill. 19811.
"See generally. Warren & Brandeis. The Right o'Privacy. 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 ( 18901 1hereinafter cited as
Warrenl.
"Smith v. Wunter, 356 F. Supp. 44, 46 IS.D. Ohio 1972).
"Berger. 388 U.S. at 65 (Douglas. J.. concurring).
"'See generally. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(c) & (d).
1021d.
"'Goldstone, supra note 12, at 384.
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need to use informants in the gathering of evidence for criminal prosecution.
The "one-party consent" exception can be discerned from the ambiguous
language of 47 U.S.C.§605." Although 18 U.S.C.§2511(2)(c) & (d),11 retain the
"one-party consent" exception,"' these exceptions must be given a strict inter-
pretation to achieve the protection of private citizens the drafters intended.07
This application of the "one-party consent" exception can be traced to On
Lee v. United States.'8 Chin Poy, an informant, was equipped with an elec-
tronic transmitter. A federal agent overheard the incriminating conversation
between On Lee and Chin Poy, resulting in On Lee's conviction for selling
opium. Because On Lee consented to Chin Poy's presence, the Supreme Court
held the contents of the conversation admissible regardless of On Lee's mistake
as to his visitor's true purpose." The rationale of On Lee rests upon the expec-
tation of the person revealing the incriminating information. If the conversa-
tion is a voluntary act, the speaker has no expectation that the information will
be kept secret."'
Twelve years later,"' the Supreme Court reaffirmed the one-party consent
exception in Lopez v. United States."2 The Internal Revenue Service equipped
an agent with a Miniform."' Lopez offered the agent a bribe. The conversation
was recorded, resulting in Lopez' conviction. Although the relationship of the
parties to each conversation was different, the Court refused to distinguish
Lopez from the prior decision of On Lee. Furthermore, the recording party in
Lopez induced the incriminating conversation."' However, the rationale of On
Lee was applied, upholding Lopez' conviction. Justice Harlan writing for the
majority, explained that the Government was only recording the conversation
"'See supra text accompanying note 27.
-0318 U.S.C. §§ 2511(21(c) & (d).
'The requirement of consent is met if the consenting party knows the electronic surveillance is taking place.
United States v. Horton 601 F.2d 319 17th Cir. 19791. For an excellent explanation of the requirement of
consent, see Fishmann. The Interception oJ Communications Without a Court Order: Title Ill. Consent and
The Expectation of]Priacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 41. 77-87 119761:seee.g.. United States v. Cortese, 568 F.
Supp. 114. 116 IM.D.Pa. 19831 1"lAIlthough cases exist in which direct evidence from an informant has not
been produced, the better course is to have the informant available" (emphasis added)): United States v. Con-
gote. 656 F.2d 971 15th Cir. 19811: United States v. Hodge, 539 F.2d 898 16th Cir. 19761: United States v.
Laughlin, 226 F. Supp. 112 ID.D.C. 19641: United States v. Pierce, 124 F. Supp. 264 IND. Ohio 19541, alffd.
224 F.2d 281 119551: United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Pa. 19391.
lol 15 CONG. REC. 23,242 119691.
"1343 U.S. 747 11952.
"'Id. at 751.
"OHodge. 539 F.2d at 903 (explaining On Lee and its continued validity for criminal prosecution).
"'Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) Ithe one-party consent exception was applied for use of an
extension telephone, making Rathburn the basis for the continued application of the one-party consent ex-
ception).
11373 U.S. 427 (1963).
"'A Miniform is a small tape recorder, concealed on the body of the IRS agent.
"'Greenwalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With The
Consent of A Participant in A Conversation. 68 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 224 (1968) lhereinafter cited as Green-
waldl.
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as a means for preserving a reliable record of the transaction. "5
Justice Brennan strongly criticized the majority decision. He stated that
permitting electronic surveillance in these situations created:
the risk that third parties, whether mechanical auditors like the Miniform
or human transcribers of mechanical transmissions as in On Lee [they
represent] - third parties who cannot be shut out of a conversation as
conventional eavesdropper can be, merely by a lowering of voices or with-
drawing to a private place."6
Because of the effect this decision would have on a person's ability to speak
freely,"7 Justice Brennan dissented, stating On Lee should be overruled." 8
Again, eight years later, in United States v. White,"9 the conviction of the
defendant was upheld. The Court allowed admission of evidence obtained dur-
ing a recorded conversation between an informant and the defendant in the
defendant's home. Justice White, for the majority, restated his position from
Katz v. United States, where he said "when a man speaks to another, he takes
all risks ordinarily inherent in so doing, including the risk that the man to
whom he speaks will make public what he has heard."'20 The Supreme Court,
by deciding White upon the rationale of On Lee,' established the validity' of
the "one-party consent" exception' in criminal proceedings.
It is important to note that application of this exception has been confined
to criminal proceedings. Some courts found fault with the reasoning in White,
especially in private conversations when there was a distinction between the
risk of the conversation being repeated and the risk of the conversation being
"recorded surreptitiously."'2 A few authors have suggested that the "one-party
consent" exception is not authorized in all situations, but is restricted to those
cases that will help obtain reliable and trustworthy evidence. 2' When the
recorded conversation is not used to effectuate criminal prosecution of the
"'Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438.
"'Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 449.
"id. at 447.
19401 U.S. 745 (1971).
"Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 n.* (1967) (White, J., concurring).
"'United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971) (The rationale of On Lee is confirmed).
"' White settles the question that evidence obtained by warrantless recording between a consenting party and
a non-consenting defendant will not be inadmissible. Special Project. Criminal Law. 16 AKRON L. REv. 628.
629 (1983): see also, United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1979): State v. (ieraldo. 68 Ohio
St.2d 120, 429 N.E.2d 141 11981) (Ohio follows the decision of White).
'See. 18 U.S.C. §§ 281121c) & (d).
"'Krely, Warrantless Electronic Surveillance in Mas.sachusetts 67 MAss. L. REV. 183. 191 119821.
"Walinski & Tucker, Expectations of Fourth Amendment Legitimacy Through State Law. 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. I. 16 (19811 Ihereinafter cited as Walinskil.
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defendant,'26 the application of the "one-party consent"'27 exception has not
been consistently applied.
The drafters of Title III realized that "private unauthorized [electronic
surveillance had] little justification when communications [were] intercepted
without the consent of one of the participants."'28 (emphasis added) The "one-
party consent" exception has the potential for thwarting the true disclosure of
a person's thoughts and ideas'29 for fear that a party to the conversation may be
recording the conversation. 3 In this situation, the use of that recording is the
controlling factor. The consenting party's invasion upon the non-consenting
party' 3' must be outweighed by some social utility for recording the conver-
sation.'.
But the original draft of Title I1111' exempted all consensual electronic
surveillance from the requirements of the legislation, even though the elec-
tronic surveillance could be used "for insidious purposes such as blackmail,
stealing business secrets or other criminal or tortious acts."'34 By applying On
Lee and its progeny in criminal proceedings, the courts would allow consensual
electronic surveillance upon private individuals. But in non-criminal situa-
tions, this rationale cannot imply that a person takes the risk that what he has
said can be recorded and used to his detriment. Should the non-consenting par-
ty take the risk that what is recorded will be broadcast in "full living color...
to the public at large" for the monetary gain of the consenting party? " When
dealing with private unauthorized consensual electronic surveillance,'36 the
non-consenting party cannot be expected to accept the risk that his conversa-
tions may be used against him. Therefore, the thrust of 18U.S.C.§251 l(2)(d) 37
is on disclosure of the conversation. 38
To support this interpretation that a violation of 18 U.S.C. §251 l(2)(d)
[hereinafter §2511(2)(d)] occurs on disclosure of the conversation, an analysis
of the language of the statute is necessary. Section 2511 (2)(d) states:
",18 U.S.C. § 251 l2)lci (codification of one-party consent exception for criminal prosecution).
'218 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d) (allows electronic surveillance with the consent of one party).
"IS. Rt-p No 1097, supra note 4, at 2156.
"2'White. 401 U.S. at 763 IDouglas, J., dissenting).
""Galloway, supra note 96, at 1008, ("electronic surveillance invades an intimate sphere of privacy, namely
the spontaneous oral utterances which occur in the course of one's personal life.").
"A person has a right to keep certain aspects of his life private, but this protection does not exist when he
consents to disclosure. (emphasis added) Warren, supra note 98, at 199.
"'Greenwalt. supra note 114, at 223.
"'S. REP. No 1097, supra note 4, at 2236.
"3Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794. 798 18th Cir. 1971).
'"Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 19th Cir. 19711.
"18 U.S.C. § 251102d.
1I4d.
"'United States v. Cianfrani, 448 F. Supp. 1102, 1121 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd. 573 F.2d 835 (19781.
[Vol. 18:3
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It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication where such person
is a party to the communication or where one of the parties has given
prior consent to such interception unless such communication is in-
tercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State
or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.'
Title III defines person, 1"I intercept, 4' wire" 2 and oral communication. 3 But
Title Ill does not define "not acting under color of law" nor the necessity of an
expectation of privacy required under the definition of oral communications.
Section 2511(2)(d) does not apply to any party to a conversation who is
there under the authority of any law enforcement agency or employed by any
office of the United States.' 4 The definition of oral communication requires
that a person must have an expectation of privacy to be protected under Title
111. This expectation of privacy is a "subjective test.""'4 The requirement is to
protect the person's right to privacy.' 6 However, the expectation must be
legitimate' 7 or reasonable' under the circumstances. The concept of
reasonableness is a relative concept,'49 allowing the party to the conversation
the right to circumscribe the nature5 and extent of disclosure of the conversa-
tion. 5 ' This standard of reasonableness for a private individual's expectation of
privacy is not determined in the same manner as a criminal defendant's. The
'"18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
1'18 U.S.C. § 2510(6). "As used in this chapter 'person' means any employee, or agent of the United States
or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock com-
pany, trust, or corporation."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). "As used in this chapter 'intercept' means the aural acquisition of the contents of any
wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
"'18 U.S.C. § 251011).
As used in this chapter "wire communication" means any communication made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any
person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of
interstate of foreign communications.
"'18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). "As used in this chapter 'oral communications' means any oral communication ut-
tered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under cir-
cumstances justifying such expectations.
'"United States v. Robertson, 562 F. Supp. 463, 465 (W.D. La. 1983).
"'Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also, Walinski, supra note
125, at 1; Carr, supra note 19, at § 1.03 [51.
'1114 CONG. REC. 14,160 (1968).
"'Special Project, Electronic Surveillance, 71 GEo. L.J. 397, 398-99 (1982).
"'See, Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the Legislative Expectation of Privacy, 34 VAND. L. REV.
1289 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Ashdown].
"'Id. at 1315.
'"Id. at 1316.
"'Warren, supra note 98, at 198, (the power to fix the extent of disclosure should be retained by the person
whose privacy is at stake).
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standard seems to be higher when the parties to the conversation are not
engaged in illegal conduct, allowing the parties more assurance that their con-
versation is not going to be disclosed to their detriment.'52 The determination
as to what is reasonable is on a case-by-case analysis.' For example, a person
is protected by §251 1(2)(d) when he does not have an expectation of total
privacy, "because he was not aware of the specific nature of another's invasion
on his privacy."'5 4
The remaining language of §2511(2)(d), "for the purpose of committing
any criminal or tortious act ... [or] any other injurious act,"'55 requires that the
interception by the consenting party may not be used to the disadvantage of
the non-consenting party. This important language restricting the use of the in-
tercepted conversation was not in the original legislation.'56 The unrestricted
use of a conversation recorded with the consent of one of the parties was, for
many, an unacceptable risk that a person would have to assume. 5 ' Senators
Hart and McClellan cooperated in amending §25 1 1(2)(d) to include the restric-
tion on the use of the intercepted conversation.'58 The Senate debates concern-
ing this amendment make it clear that "one-party consent" exceptions were in-
applicable "except for private persons acting in a defensive manner."'5 9 This
amended language was intended to eliminate the disclosure of the conversa-
tion, if it would injure the other party by publicly embarrassing him," "or any
other way.""'
Under the analysis of §251 1(2)(d), it is the purpose'6 ' for which the conver-
sation is intercepted that determines if §25 11(2)(d) exempts that person from
liability. 3 If the consenting party intends to use that information to the other
party's detriment, he is clearly unable to use §251 1(2)(d) as a shield to protect
himself from criminal prosecution' for violating Title III or civil liability'65 for
damages. The legislative history has not adequately explained what is included
'
52Benford v. ABC, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (D. Md. 1980), affid, 661 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1980).
1531d.
"'Bianco v. ABC, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 182, 185 (N.D. 111. 1979).
'N-18 U.S.C. § 251112)(d) (unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state or for the
purpose of committing any other injurious act.).
"'United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 324 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
"114 CONG. REC. 14,476 (1968).
111Id. at 14,694.
159Id.
"'The debaters implied this amendment would help eliminate industrial espionage. Id.
16Consumer Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1194, 1195 (D. Colo. 1983).
"'Benford, 502 F. Supp. at 1162, see also, Carr, supra note 19, at § 8.05131.
'18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1).
-518 U.S.C. § 2520.
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in the language, "criminal, tortious or... any other injurious act.",, But Con-
gress attempted to eliminate the interception of private conversations and the
disclosure of that conversation against the speaker to the advantage of the in-
tercepting party.'67
The disclosure of the intercepted conversation for the purpose of
blackmail"'8 or the stealing of business secrets' 9 has been considered a criminal
purpose and is prohibited. However, in United States v. Traficant,'7" the
Northern District Court of Ohio seems to reject the use of conversations for
the purpose of blackmail as the basis for the suppression of the recorded con-
versation. In Traficant, the defendant alleged his conversation with under-
world figures was recorded by the underworld for blackmail. The legal
authorities obtained the recording of these conversations and presented them
at the defendant's trial on charges of bribery. The defendant sought to suppress
these conversations as a violation of Title 111. The court perceived that the ma-
jor purpose of Title III was to control organized crime and although the pur-
pose included "across the board prohibition on all unauthorized electronic
surveillance,"'' the unauthorized surveillance which was specifically an-
ticipated under §251 l(2)(d) were the areas of industry, divorce and politics.'72
Judge Aldrich stated that to allow suppression of the evidence because it was
obtained for blackmail "would add a new category to the list of protected
privacy interest - illegal activities."'7 This decision is consistent with the in-
terpretation of §25 1(2)(d). The disclosure of the conversation was not for the
purpose of blackmail as the defendant claimed. Therefore, his motion for the
suppression of the evidence was properly overruled. The reason the recorded
conversation was properly admitted was because it was used by law enforce-
ment officials for the defensive purpose of preservation of evidence."
Invasion of privacy is a tortious act under §251 1(2)(d)."'7 The application
and recognition of invasion of privacy as a tort is to be determined by the law
of the individual states. "6 Invasion of privacy has been divided into four
1-18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
"'
67Smith v. Wunker, 356 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
'"Consumer 568 F. Supp. at 1197.
" Greenwalt, supra note 114, at 234.
7558 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
'Id. at 1002.
172d.
"
31d.
r'Under this analysis, the court did not analyze the applicability of § 2511(2)(d) when the consenting party
to the conversation has not authorized its use in the proceedings.
"Brown v. ABC, Inc., 704 F.2d 1296, 1301 (4th Cir. 1983).
"'Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
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distinct torts: appropriation,'77 intrusion, 7 ' public disclosure of private facts,'79
and false light.8 0 A tortious act constituting a violation under §25 1(2)(d) most
likely will include intrusion upon a person and the public disclosure of private
facts.' If the disclosure is defaming or libelous, 1 2 this would be tortious within
the meaning of §251 1(2)(d). In some circumstances, the infliction of emotional
distress has been used as a prohibited purpose under §251 1(2)(d).' 83
Although Congress did not define "injurious act,"'8 4 this language taken in
conjunction with criminal and tortious is interpreted as an illegitimate act, 85
not amounting to a crime or a tort that harms the non-consenting party.' The
purpose must be illegitimate to fall within the language of "injurious act." The
preservation of an accurate record for important purposes'87 or for the protec-
tion of the consenting party against blackmail'88 or having a secretary
transcribe a conversation 89 are not injurious acts. The use of a recorded con-
versation in a criminal proceeding is a legitimate act and therefore not in-
jurious.' 8 There is a scarcity of case law interpreting exactly what was intend-
ed by "injurious act." It has been implied that recording a conversation to gain
political advantage,'' for improperly terminating an employee's employment
with the company, 2 and for the purpose of filing a lawsuit'93 are injurious acts.
The burden to show that the purpose for recording the conversation was not
for criminal, tortious or other injurious acts is on the party claiming protection
from liability under §2511(2)(d).' 94
"'See generally. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 804-7 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of
TORIS § 652C (1976).
' "See generally, W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTs § 117 at 807-914thed. 19711: RESFATEMENT ISECOND) OF
TORtS § 652B (1976).
"'See generallv. W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 809-12 (4th ed. 1971): RESrArEMENT SECOND)
OF TORtS § 652D (1976).
""See generally'. W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF ToRrs § 117 at 812-15 14th ed. 1971): RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORrS § 652E (1976).
" Greenwalt, supra note 114, at 236.
"Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 j1966) (setting out the elements of libel).
"Dietemann v. Time, Inc.. 449 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1971): Gerrard v. Blackmann, 401 F. Supp. 1189,
1193 (N.D. III. 1975).
'"Moore v. Telfon Communications Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1978).
"'Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 1971).
"Id.
"'Meredith. 446 F.2d at 799.
'Moore. 589 F.2d at 966: By-Prod Corp. v. Armer-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 1982).
"'Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, Ill (19551.
'"'United States v. Robertson, 562 F. Supp 463, 465 )W.D. La. 19831.
"Hearings on Invasion o/ Prit'acy. Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 2261 11966) (statement of Senator Long): Traficant. 558 F. Supp. at
1001.
12Moore, 589 F.2d at 965.
"'Consumer, 568 F. Supp. at 1197.
"'Consumer, 568 F. Supp. at 1196: United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 326 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
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Title II not only provides for suppression of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of its provision, but also allows a civil cause of action for harm inflicted as
a result of this violation.' 5 Title IlI allows recovery of one hundred dollars for
each day the violation occurs or one thousand dollars, whichever is greater, '
plus reasonable attorney fees.' 7 Recovery under Title Ill is to be the exclusive
remedy available to the injured party.' 8 A defense to a claim for civil damages
is a good faith reliance' 9 on a court order authorizing electronic surveillance. "'
A CASE IN POINT: Boddie v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.
A party to a conversation can record that conversation for-defensive pur-
poses.20'" He may do so in an attempt to preserve the contents of the conversa-
tion or for future reference to the actual terms that were agreed upon.
However, if a party to the conversation discloses the conversation so that he
may profit or gain some advantage over the non-consenting party, this is an of-
fensive"' purpose and prohibited by §251 1(2)(d). Boddie 1). American Broad-
casting Co., Inc.203 is an excellent example of a consenting party attempting to
use the "one-party consent" exception to justify the recording of a conversa-
tion that he used for his benefit and, in the end, to the detriment of the non-
consenting party. ABC was investigating judicial corruption in preparation for
a broadcast entitled "Injustice For All". 04 During the investigation, on the
pretext of having a private conversation for background material,0 5 ABC inter-
viewed Sandra Boddie." ABC's investigative reporter, Geraldo Rivera, carried
a concealed radio transmitter and hidden camera into Boddie's living room to
record the interview.207 Boddie brought suit against ABC. In count three, her
complaint alleged that ABC had violated Title 111.208 This count was dismissed
sua sponte.209 After a seven-week trial, the jury returned a verdict for defen-
"18 U.S.' § 2520.
V",Id.
""Wolf v. Wolf, 570 F. Supp. 826, 827 ID.S. (. 1983).
"'S. R-ie. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2196.
"Carr, supra note 19 at § 8.05: Jandak v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 81. 820fND. III. 19811 icon
sent is not a good faith defense under § 2520).
"'Abramson v. Mitchell. 459 F.2d 955 18th cir. 19721.
2111114 ('ON(. REC. 14,694 119681.
-"Consumer. 568 F. Supp. at 1197.
-'.731 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1984).
'"Id. at 335.
"'Plaintiff's Complaint at 4, Boddie v. ABC. Inc.. No. (80-675A (ND. Ohio filed May I, 19801.
-"The interview with Sandra Boddie took place at her home on April 17, 1980. Appellant's Brief at 6, Boddie
v. ABC, Inc., 731 F.2d 333 16th Cir. 19841.
2..71d.
""Boddie's complaint alleged. "'he information was obtained through the interception of an oral com-
munication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 251 Il IlaIl(c & (dli 11979)." Plaintiff's (omplaint at 8-9. Boddie v.
ABC Inc., No. C80-67A (N.D. Ohio filed May I, 1980).
-"On Feb. 12, 1982, the court dismissed count three of Plaintiffs complaint, stating "that the area of law is
one which the court is eminently familiar." Judge Aldrich said Plaintiff had not stated a cause of action.
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dants on the remaining two counts2 of the complaint. Boddie only appealed
the dismissal of count three.2 ' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the district court's decision. 2
ABC claimed that they recorded the conversation to preserve an accurate
record of the interview."' Clark R. Mollenhoff, ABC's expert witness and a
highly respected investigative reporter, claimed "it would have been irresponsi-
ble not to have used the hidden camera."2"' The appellate court did not agree."
The purpose of the recorded interview was a question for the jury to decide. "'
Boddie alleged in her complaint that she had suffered personal humiliation and
embarrassment."' The recording of the interview for the purpose of televising
a report concerning judicial corruption did not allow ABC to seek protection
under the "one-party consent" exception.28 ABC did not use the recorded con-
versation for the defensive purpose of preserving an accurate account of the in-
terview. Instead, ABC broadcast the recording to their television viewers in a
highly controversial investigative report. Although ABC claimed their reason
for recording the conversation was a defensive purpose, their disclosure of the
conversation to their viewing audience was for their own benefit and detrimen-
tal to the private individual, Sandra Boddie. The electronic surveillance was
committed for the purpose of committing an injurious act,2 public embarrass-
ment,220 to Boddie.
Because ABC intercepted an oral communication,"' Boddie's expectation
of privacy 222 is an important factor to consider. Boddie invited Rivera to her
house and knew he was an investigative reporter. 2 However, she was not
Boddie. 731 F.2d at 336. This familiarity with Title III may have been, in the criminal context. due to the
litigation heard by Judge Aldrich concerning electronic surveillance in United States v. Traficant, 588 F.
Supp. 996 IN.D. Ohio 1983).
'"'ount one alleged the broadcast placed Boddie in false light as well as public disclosure of private facts.
count two alleged defamation. Boddie. 731 F.2d. at 335.
"On appeal, Boddie claimed that ABC criminally violated 47 (.F.R. 2.701, 15.4. 15.11, 15.154 (19821 all
FCC regulations attempting to negate the one-party consent exception under 18 U.S.C. § 2511121d) 11979).
Id. at 336. The appellate court held the recording of the conversation was not a violation of FCC regula-
tions. Id. at 339. Seealso. iordon v. NBC. 287 F.Supp. 452 IS.D.N.Y. 19681: Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC. 316 U.S. 4 (19421.
2 2Boddie. 731 F.2d at 339.
2 Appellee's Brief at 14, Boddie v. ABC, Inc. 731 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1984).
21"d. at 16.
2
'Boddie. 731 F.2d at 338.
2
'"Plaintiff's Complaint at II, Boddie v. ABC, Inc., No. C80-675A IND. Ohio May I, 1980).
2.818 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
2 WId.
21 14 CONG. REC. 14,694 (1968).
::118 U.S.C. § 251012.
:-.See supra text accompanying notes 145-54.
::'Appellee's Brief at 13, Boddie v. ABC. Inc. 731 F.2d 333 16th Cir. 1984.
[Vol. 18:3
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 18 [1985], Iss. 3, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol18/iss3/7
aware that the conversation was being filmed or recorded." ' The expectation
of privacy in this situation is not an inflexible standard. ' Although Boddie
voluntarily exposed herself to the personal observation of Rivera, she did not
voluntarily expose herself to the "televised or video-taped monitoring of her
every action." '226 The devastating effect the surreptitious recording and filming
has on the privacy of the individual is not the type of risk a private individual
in a conversation must assume." '
The private individual should be afforded some protection from this inva-
sion upon his privacy.2" Though an integral part of the dissemination of news
requires investigative reporting,22 electronic surveillance is not an "indispensi-
ble tool of newsgathering. '23 The investigative reporter should not be allowed
to invoke the "one-consent party" exception as a means to violate the "sacred
precincts of private and domestic life."23' Although our society does and should
protect the free dissemination of news, 2' it should not afford newsmen im-
munity from harming private individuals during the course of their news-
gathering."' If ABC's purpose had been defensive to preserve an accurate
reproduction of the interview in the event any of the facts were disputed, then
the electronic surveillance would be a legitimate application of the "one-party
consent" exception. However, when ABC broadcast this surreptitiously
recorded interview to their advantage, publicly embarrassing Boddie, this was
not within the acceptable boundaries of the "one-party consent" exception.
Some may suggest that this unfavorably restricts the free gathering and
dissemination of news. However, upon closer examination, it allows the in-
vestigative reporter the necessary freedom to gather this information, but not
to use electronic surveillance to sensationalize the story. He can preserve and
protect himself from changes, fabrications, and distortions, while protecting
society from the fear that every conversation may be the subject of electronic
surveillance. This still allows the press free access to the essential facts for an
accurate presentation of newsworthy material. In this way, the few who abuse
the right to surreptitiously record interviews will only be subjected to liability
-'!Boddie. 731 F.2d at 335.
2'Ashdown, supra note 148. at 1315.
"ld. at 1316.
!"See supra text accompanying notes 123-38.
221W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF TORrS § 117 14th ed. 197 11.
:-'Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 119711.
j.'Id.
23Warren, supra note 98, at 195.
..
2U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Even under the protection of the First Amendment, the press cannot publish or
broadcast information that is obscene, libelous, fighting words, or purely commercial speech. See. Roth v.
United States 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) (obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy), Valentine v. Chrestensen. 316
U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (commercial speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (false ut-
terances likely to provoke a breach of the peace).
"'Dietemann. 449 F.2d at 249.
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if that recording is disclosed to the detriment of the other individual."4 .
CONCLUSION
Title Ill has been a successful tool to combat organized crime and
eliminate private unauthorized electronic surveillance.35 The application of
the "one-party consent" exception does have an essential purpose in both the
criminal and private context. Title III recognizes this exception, but must be
interpreted to protect an unacceptable intrusion into private conversations.""
It is because of this potential intrusion that some authors have advocated a ban
on all private unauthorized electronic surveillance."7
But by strictly adhering to the interpretation and application of the "one-
party consent" exception, the complete prohibition of electronic surveillance is
not necessary." ' Although the language of §25 11(2)(d) may be somewhat am-
biguous as to the true intention of the drafters, an interpretation consistent
with the purpose of Title Ill would only allow disclosure of the conversation
for a defensive purpose. By establishing this distinction between offensive and
defensive disclosure of the conversation, private unauthorized electronic
surveillance will not threaten the privacy of the law-abiding citizen. 3
This application of the "one-party consent" exception would protect per-
sons who use electronic surveillance for defensive purposes as well as protect
unsuspecting subjects from injurious uses of electronic surveillance. However,
the application of the "one-party consent" exception has not consistently been
applied to effectuate this protection. It has become a cloak of immunity for
many who abuse the use of electronic surveillance while at the same time it has
become an intrusion into the lives of many individuals. If the "one-party con-
sent" exception is correctly applied, Title Ill's purpose to protect individuals
from private unauthorized electronic surveillance will be fulfilled."'
THOMAS C. DANIELS
""'A f'ee society prefers to punish the few who abuse the rights of speech after they break the law then to
throttle them and all others beforehand." Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n. 13
11980.
I'l 15 CON0. REC. 23,238 (1969) (View of Mr. McClellan, Wiretapping, Privacy, and Title 111.
"'Carr, supra note 19 at § 2.05141.
2 3Greenwalt, supra note 114, at 231.
"'Goldsmith, supra note II, at 4.
23
"See. Special Project, Electronic Surveillance. 71 GEO. L.J. 397 (1982).
2
'Goldsmith, supra note II, at 3.
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